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Abstract 
A study of Hindu engagements with violence which have been structured by scriptural 
themes reveals that violence has been regulated, enacted, resisted, negated or denied in 
complex ways. Disputes based on Vedic orthodoxy were channelled, in classical India, 
through the mythical frameworks of gods clashing with demons, and later in the medieval 
centuries this template was extended to the Muslim foreigners who threatened the 
Brahmanical socio-religious orders.  In the modern period, the electoral mechanisms of 
colonial modernity spurred Hindu anxieties about a weakened nation which would die out in 
the face of Muslim solidarity, and various Hindu organizations began to increasingly draw on 
motifs from the Vedas, Bhagavad-gītā, and other texts to speak of a martial Hindu nation. 
These two moments—the articulation of the boundaries of the robust Hindu nation and the 
projection of the Muslim as the enemy lurking at the gates—have been integral to the shaping 
of Hindu cultural nationalism by several key thinkers and political activists. Thus, the forms 
of violence associated with Hindu universes should be placed within their dynamic socio-
historical contexts where Hindus have interpreted, engaged with, and acted on a range of 
scriptural texts both to generate violent solidarities and to speak of peace.  A study of these 
phenomena alongside some Christian theological attempts to legitimize, valorize or transcend 
violence from within scriptural horizons points to the complex conceptual terrain 
encompassed by the conjunction in “religion and violence.” 
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A characteristic feature of several strands of Hindu modernity is the claim that Hindu 
life-worlds are steeped in pacifism, non-violence, and benevolence towards the religious 
other. From around the turn of the twentieth century, certain indigenous constructions of a 
Vedic golden age began to represent Hindus as inherently peace-loving individuals who 
were, however, compelled to engage in violent conflict to guard themselves against the 
depredations of the foreigners, whether they were Muslims, British colonialists, or Christian 
missionaries. The dichotomy between an intrinsically non-violent Hinduism, on the one hand, 
and Islam or Christianity, which are fundamentally antagonistic to socio-religious diversity, 
on the other hand, continues to structure several styles of Hindu polemical literature and 
political rhetoric in contemporary India. For a striking expression of this viewpoint, we may 
turn to Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar: “Hindusthan lived a life of unchallenged glory and 
power for thousands of years and spread its spiritual and cultural effulgence over vast areas 
of the globe […] Never has its flag waded towards military victory through the blood and 
tears of those races as it happened with Islam and Christianity when they spread to new 
countries. Its victory had always been moral and cultural.” 1 However, as we will argue, these 
binary oppositions, which seek, in effect, to distinguish between a “spiritual Hinduism” 
which is sanitized from all contact with violence, and a “worldly Hinduism” which steps into 
warfare only because of external provocations, gloss over the complex dialectic between the 
quest for peace and the structures of violence in various premodern Hindu cultures. The 
Hindu epic narratives and the philosophical-soteriological traditions often agonize over the 
1 Golwalkar 2000, 161. 
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moral dilemmas of engagement in unavoidable forms of violence against the backdrop of the 
overarching value of non-violence. 
 
We will explore some of the intersections between patterns of violent action and the 
attempts to categorically deny or reject violence in Hindu universes. We begin with some 
recent analyses of the nexus between “religion” and “violence,” especially in the case of the 
medieval Crusades. While the crusades are precisely the kind of Christian-Muslim hostilities 
that some Hindu thinkers point to in support of their claim that “violence” and the “Semitic 
religions” are necessarily interlinked, our discussion will highlight the contingent 
associations between religious templates and political transformations in the generation of 
religious violence. We will then explore this theme of the interconnection between scriptural 
motifs and historical events in some classical and medieval Hindu contexts, and in two 
specific modern Hindu configurations, the Arya Samaj (established 1875) and the All-India 
Hindu Mahasabha (established 1915). The instances of violence associated with Hindu 
scriptural values and norms that we will discuss sometimes vary significantly, with the 
modernist vocabulary of electoral representation, census categories and lower caste political 
mobilization adding distinctive valences to the discourses of violence in the Samaj and the 
Mahasabha that were not present in premodern South Asia. However, we will highlight 
certain underlying continuities in the manner in which some texts from the Vedas, the 
Bhagavad-gītā, and the Purāṇas have been repeatedly invoked, in medieval and 
contemporary India, to direct violence against either the internal Others (such as the non-
Vedic Buddhists and Jains) or the external Others (the Muslims and the Christians who are 
portrayed as foreign invaders). These scriptural narratives do not always categorically deny 
violence, but seek to regulate it towards specific worldly goals, which generates the moral 
dilemma of Arjuna on the eve of a righteous war (dharma yuddha) in the Bhagavad-gītā, 
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where he initially refuses to engage in fratricidal violence. Further, the motif of cosmic 
clashes between the gods and the anti-gods elaborated in various epic narratives is often 
appropriated by Hindu nationalist organizations to project ongoing Hindu-Muslim conflicts 
onto a mythic register. Our discussion of these complexities in Hindu socio-religious 
structures will indicate that Hindu-Muslim religious conflicts emerge at volatile points of 
intersection between, on the one hand, scriptural templates which seemingly demand certain 
kinds of violence, and, on the other hand, complex patterns of socio-historical transitions 
during which these templates are called upon to sustain oppositional identities against 
concrete historical rivals. 
 
The Religious Cause in Violent Conflicts  
One of the reasons why the relation between “religion” and “violence” remains an intensely 
contested matter is that it is usually not possible to pick out a specific religious theme, value, 
or narrative as the sole cause of violent conflicts. While the adherents of the world religions 
usually view these traditions as pacifistic horizons which promote harmony and 
reconciliation, historians and observers of these religions also highlight the various patterns 
of war and violence that have been associated with them. Mark Juergensmeyer, Margo Kitts 
and Michael Jerryson point out that this “disconnect” between the two perspectives “raises 
some profound questions: Is violence peripheral to the religious imagination or at its core? Is 
it religion that promotes violence or some other social or natural factor? Is religion even 
distinguishable from those factors?”2 An additional complication is that because there are no 
“objective” definitions of violence which are accepted across the world’s religious traditions, 
the wider the definition, the greater the implication of a certain religion with violence. While 
intentionally causing bodily harm to individuals could count as “violence,” the term could 
2 Juergensmeyer, Kitts, and Jerryson 2013, 2.  
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also be extended, at least in the perception of outsiders, to the Jain practice of fasting to 
death, renunciatory practices of some Hindu ascetics or Catholic monks, and so on. The 
violence involved in revolutionary uprisings and massacres is very graphic, while the 
everyday violence of infant mortality, disease, and despair that destroys the socially 
marginalised with greater frequency is often invisible. Therefore, according to Nancy 
Scheper-Hughes and Phillipe Bourgois violence “defies easy categorization. It can be 
everything and nothing; legitimate or illegitimate; visible or invisible; necessary or useless; 
senseless and gratuitous or utterly rational and strategic.”3 
Given these wide definitional ranges, we will limit our discussion to some specific 
instances in Hindu universes where, as we will see, religious templates have shaped or 
transformed the nature of conflicts—by locating violence on transcendental horizons, by 
supplying institutional forms of mobilization, and by shaping individual and collective 
identities.4 The cosmic visions of religious traditions can generate and intensify intra-group 
solidarities by appealing to scriptural texts such as the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, 
which contain warnings against the adversaries of God or individuals who are unfaithful to 
God. The Biblical narratives which portray peoples locked in patterns of conflict have, 
according to Regina Schwartz,5  authorized intolerance against the other by appeal to the will 
of God. Thus, the portraits of a God who is ruthless, vindictive, and wrathful have been 
appropriated by diverse figures to defend their military struggles. For instance, Oliver 
Cromwell drew parallels between his own revolution and the Exodus, and between the 
Catholics in Ireland and the Canaanites, while some years later the Puritans in New England 
drew upon these biblical texts to present the native Indians as the Canaanites and the 
3 Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2014, 2. 
4 Cady and Simon 2007, 16. 
5 Schwartz 1997. 
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Amalekites.6 However, as these examples also indicate, the Biblical visions have promoted 
and sustained conflicts by becoming enmeshed in a complex of socio-economic changes and 
political upheavals.  
As Heather Gregg has pointed out, while scriptural passages which speak of violence 
directed at those who are not in the company of the faithful have existed for several centuries, 
individuals have resorted to violent conflict by appealing to these passages only in specific 
socio-political contexts, which have been shaped by numerous variables other than religious 
understandings. Religious groups turn to violence for a diversity of goals such as responding 
to real or perceived threats to the identity and the faith of the community, especially within 
contexts of rapid socio-political changes, fighting governments which are perceived to be 
corrupt, and even hastening the apocalypse and ushering in an era of millennial peace and 
prosperity. Therefore Gregg argues that “religiously motivated violence is the result of 
specific interpretations of a religion’s beliefs and scriptures rather than the mere presence of 
specific passages in a tradition’s holy books or doctrines.”7 She details four variables whose 
interplay produces ‘religiously motivated violence’: the socio-political contexts which 
produce scriptural interpretations which summon the faithful to take up arms in violent 
conflict; the religious leaders who can speak authoritatively and generate these 
interpretations; the followers who will answer the call to fight and willing to defend the faith; 
and the material, social, and technological resources which enable conflict to grow (Gregg 
2014:31). The enmeshing between ‘organization’ and ‘ideas’ indicated here, as will see, was 
to play a crucial role also in the imaginations of some Hindus, elaborated through the print 
culture of late colonial India, of a Hindu nation besieged by the foreigners within their midst, 
the Muslims.  
 
6 Collins 2004, 20. 
7 Gregg 2014, 3. 
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Justifying Violence as Non-Violence in Premodern Hinduisms 
While Biblical passages, which speak of the institution of the “people of God” and set them 
against the nations, have been appropriated by some figures as a rallying cry towards violent 
conflicts in their own historical times, other passages outline a vision of peace and plenitude 
under the sovereign God. The ambivalence towards violence across the Christian traditions 
over two millennia is perhaps even more intensely focused in some of the Vedic and post-
Vedic texts, which, on the one hand, view the cosmic order as sacrificially produced and 
sustained by sacrificial rituals, and, on the other, seek to deny the violence of the sacrifice. As 
Joseph A. Magno points out, there are certain Hindu texts which “unequivocably condone” 
and others which “unequivocably condemn” violent acts.8 The Rg Veda 1.162.21 already 
resorts to a euphemism in negating the violent killing in a sacrifice: the animal victim in the 
aśvamedha sacrifice is told that it does not really die nor is it truly harmed, but it goes on to 
the gods on pleasant paths.9 The Brāhmaṇas, which are commentaries on the Vedic rituals, 
display a clear ambivalence towards sacrifice, and enjoin priests to take the sacrificial victim 
outside the altar space when it is killed, and to kill it by suffocating it to muffle its cries. The 
animal is to be killed by a specially appointed priest, the Śamitṛ, after the sacrificer and the 
other priests have turned away from the victim. The sacrificer, in turning away from the 
animal and the Śamitṛ, says: “You do not really die here, you are not hurt, you are going to 
the gods along paths easy to traverse …”10 Referring to this unease relating to the slaughter 
of animals in the Vedic rituals, Brian Smith and Wendy Doniger note: “The reluctance to face 
the horrific reality of human beings profanely killing animals in the sacred ritual leads the 
Brahmins to imagine that they are operating in the morally pure universe of the divine: they 
do not ‘kill’ like humans but, like the gods, they make the victim ‘acquiesce’ in its own death 
8 Magno 1988, 79. 
9 Vidal, Tarabout and Meyer 2003, 15-16. 
10 Houben 1999, 118. 
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or ‘make it pass away’.”11 Later, with the Upaniṣads, the individual’s inner self (ātman) is 
posited as the site of the true sacrifice, into which are offered the mental functions which are 
homologized with the material sacrificial elements.  
The anti-ritualism of the Upaniṣads provided the context where the earlier Vedic 
anxieties about sacrificial violence led to substitutionary vegetable offerings and the 
emergence of the ethic of non-violence.12 However, while the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads 
display a deep ambivalence about sacrificial violence, and the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga texts 
begin to increasingly emphasize non-harm (ahiṃsā), leading exegetes of the Mīmāṃsā school 
such as Kumārila (c.700 CE) defend ritual violence against the charge that Vedic rituals are 
impure because of their association with the infliction of harm. Kumārila responds that the 
general rule about not harming others is to be set aside in the case of sacrifices which are 
specifically enjoined by the Vedic scriptures.13 The Vedāntic theologian Rāmānuja (1017–
1137 CE) too, while commenting on Bhagavad-gītā 2.31—“For a Kṣatriya [ruler] there is no 
greater good than a righteous war”—draws on the textual strategy of the Brāhmaṇas to 
negate the violence of the war. He notes that in the Agnīṣomīya ritual no injury (hiṃsā) is 
caused to the animal which is immolated, for the sacrificial victim will attain heaven with an 
auspicious body. Just as the lancing and the operations of a surgeon are directed at curing the 
patient, the killing of the animal too is for its own protection.14 
The attempts of the Vedic traditions to respond to the Buddhist and Jain emphases on 
non-violence (ahiṃsā) only accentuated the contrast, especially in the epics such as the 
Mahābhārata, between the dharmic duty of rulers to engage in necessary violence and the 
goal of spiritual liberation through the complete renunciation of worldly violence. The epics 
suggest that, provided kingly force is employed for the preservation of dharmic order and the 
11 Smith and Doniger 1989, 209. 
12 Pennington 2012, 24-25.  
13 Houben 1999, 145. 
14 Sampatkumaran 1985, 38-39. 
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protection of the innocent, the violence involved in the fulfillment of the king’s caste duty is 
legitimate. Through the exercise of royal power, the king provides the canopy under which 
ascetics and Brahmins may follow the path of non-violence, so that “[o]nly by means of 
Kshatriya violence is the renouncer’s nonviolence even possible.” 15 However, somewhat 
paradoxically, the ascetic, precisely by renouncing the Vedic world and entering into a space 
of absolute non-violence, gains a spiritual autonomy which can generate the power to oppose 
or ally with kings: “The ascetic then becomes simultaneously representative of both ‘non-
violence’ and limitless power, and a central and recurrent figure in all representations 
pertaining to violence and non-violence …” 16   Thus, both kings and ascetics are often 
depicted in their hagiographies as engaged with their opponents through diverse modes of 
conflict, opposition, and co-option to defend their own religious standpoints.  
The medieval hagiography of Śaṁkara, the Śaṃkaradigvijaya describes how he 
reduced to ashes with his yogic power several tantric Kāpālika ascetics who had attacked his 
patron, King Sudhanvan.17 According to some legends, the Śaiva saint Appar was initially a 
Jain, but after his miraculous conversion to Śaivism, he was subjected to various kinds of 
punishments by Mahendravarman I (580–630) of Kanchi. He survived, and the king 
thereafter himself became a Śaivite, destroyed the Jain monastery, and built a Śiva temple.18 
The relations between Śaivites and Vaiṣṇavites too were sometimes marked by intense 
hostilities and the maintenance of social distance. Jan Gonda19  argues that Vaiṣṇavites were 
often “passively intolerant” in their social exchanges with the Śaivites—that is, they did not 
seek to actively harm Śaivites while they avoided their contact which was viewed as ritually 
polluting. Vaiṣṇavites were to be devoted to only one God (ekāntin), and worship no other 
15 Pennington 2012, 26. 
16 Vidal, Tarabour and Meyer 2003, 17. 
17 Tapasyanand 1986, 167. 
18 Narayanan and Veluthat 2000, 392. 
19 Gonda 1970, 93. 
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deities such as Śiva, Durga, and others as equal to Viṣṇu. Śaivite texts, in turn, sometimes 
consign to hellish punishment individuals who will not give the highest worship to Śiva. 
Further, across the boundaries of Vedic orthodoxy, Hindus and Jains have sometimes 
borrowed from one another idioms, notions, and images through complex strategies of 
accommodation and appropriations. While the Jain fordmakers (tīrthaṅkaras) are sometimes 
related to Hindu gods, and the Jain Somadeva (c.1000 CE) allowed Jains to accept regional 
customs which did not directly negate the basic teachings of Jainism, Hindus sometimes 
incorporated the first fordmaker, Rishabha, as a minor incarnation (avatāra) of Viṣṇu. 
Notwithstanding these overlaps, Jain texts often sharply challenged the Brahmanical Hindu 
claims about the transcendental origin of the Vedas, arguing that the view that these 
scriptures did not have a human author could not be defended. The Jain scriptures, on the 
other hand, because they had been conveyed by the omniscient tīrthaṅkara, were said to be 
superior to the Vedas.20  
Kings, too, are presented as involved in these conflicts over Vedic orthodoxy because 
they are viewed as divine avatāras who have appeared to rid the world of enemy demons 
through violent wars. The mythic paradigm of the Purāṇas where gods are threatened by the 
anti-gods (asuras) is employed by some medieval poets to identify historical enemies or 
outsiders (mleccha), such as the Hun invaders or Muslims, with demoniac powers. The 
Vikramānkābhyudaya is set against the historical backdrop of the clashes between the 
Chalukya and the Rashtrakuta dynasties in peninsular India (c.1200 CE), and applies this 
paradigm to these two Hindu kingdoms. The text describes Viṣṇu’s promise to the gods, in 
the style of the Purāṇas, that he will be born on earth to rid it of the demonic Rashtrakutas 
and restore Vedic order. Later, on Śiva’s request, Viṣṇu is born again as Vikramaditya VI, 
20 Dundas 1992, 200-203. 
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who, it is predicted, will destroy the demons of the Rashtrakutas and bring in an era of 
righteousness and prosperity.  
The same paradigm is used also in some Purāṇas to depict non-Vedic beliefs and 
practices, such as Buddhism and Jainism; the practitioners of these non-Vedic systems are, in 
fact, demons who have been misled by false views preached to them by the gods.21 The 
scriptural trope of demonic powers, which are opposed to the Vedic socio-religious order, 
appears in several Sanskrit and Telugu inscriptions from medieval Andhra Pradesh in 
southern India. The Vilasa Grant of Prolaya Nayaka, written in Sanskrit, and issued between 
1325 and 1350 CE, describes how with the defeat of Prataparudra, a ruler of the Kakatiya 
dynasty, by the lord of the Turks, Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq, the “pitch darkness of the 
Turks enveloped the world.” After the righteous Prataparudra was vanquished, Brahmin 
priests were forced to abandon their ritual activities, their villages were confiscated, the 
temples were desecrated, and so on, by the “demon-like” soldiers. While these descriptions 
have sometimes been taken as evidences of actual Muslim brutalities, CynthiaTalbot argues 
that we should read them as reflecting the stylized predictions of the morally degenerate Kali 
age in the Purāṇas, which outline socio-moral decline in terms of the dissolution of the ritual 
privileges of the Brahmin priests.22 The inscription goes on to note that the Muslim advance 
was halted by Prolaya Nayaka, who appeared as an avatāra of Viṣṇu, and restored dharma by 
re-establishing the villages of the Brahmins, reinstalling Vedic sacrifices, and taking only the 
lawful portions of the cultivators’ crops. According to Talbot, these religious invocations are 
part of the attempt of Nayaka, who had stepped into the power vacuum produced by the 
collapse of the Kakatiyas, to highlight the demoniac ways of the Muslims and to present 
himself as the legitimate king who would uphold the Brahmanical order.23 
21 Granoff 1984, 291--295 
22 Talbot 1995, 696-697. 
23 Talbot 1995, 703. 
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The historical and legendary accounts that we have discussed indicate the complex 
intermeshing between the spiritual values of non-violence (ahiṃsā), the quest for liberation 
(mokṣa), and the embodied power in historical contexts ridden with multiple forms of ritual, 
kingly and military violence. Hindu ascetics were themselves sometimes engaged in worldly 
violence. Particularly in late medieval India, at a time of the dissolution of imperial authority, 
some groups were organized into regiments (akhāṛā) to protect the lands of temples and 
monasteries. There are accounts of clashes between Vaiṣṇavite ascetics (bairāgīs) and Śaivite 
Daśanāmī ascetics (nāgas), primarily over collection of dues from pilgrims, and rights of 
precedence at religious fairs such as the Kumbh mela.24 The nāga army of the Śaivite ascetic 
Anupgiri Gosain is said to have reached at one point the figure of 30,000 ascetics, who were 
armed with tridents, swords, iron discs, muskets, and rockets.25 Therefore, pointing out that 
western observers are often surprised to see Hindus engaged in violent conflict in India, 
Doniger argues: “[I]t is what Hindus have said, and what they have seemed to believe, rather 
than what they have done, that had led to the European and American expectation of Hindu 
tolerance.” 26  While quite often the Indic traditions have been viewed, both by Hindus 
themselves and by western observers, through the lens of Gandhian non-violence, Gandhi 
himself contended that a violent strand was deeply embedded in Indian cultures, including the 
narratives of the Mahābhārata, the Bhagavad-gītā, and the Rāmāyaṇa.27 As we will see, the 
modernist appropriations of the violent aspects of traditional Hindu scriptural and mythic 
themes were integral to the development of certain types of militant Hindu nationalism. 
 
Hindu Selves and the Muslim Other 
The socio-political landscapes of colonial India were marked by the emergence of various 
24 Lorenzen 1978, 70. 
25 Gier 2014, xvi. 
26 Doniger 2003, 111. 
27 Parekh 1989, 48. 
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Hindu groups which attempted to interweave western ideas, institutions, and norms with 
classical Vedic formulations, resulting in hybridized configurations with varying attitudes 
towards violence. The Brahmo Samaj, founded in 1829, was for the most part involved in 
matters of Hindu social reform and the establishment of Vedāntic Hindu forms of worship in 
response to the critiques of “Hindu idolatry” levelled by Christian missionaries.28 While the 
theme of national identity, and disputes relating to whether such identity would be elaborated 
with vocabulary inflected by Hindu texts and symbols, do not figure prominently in the 
lectures and publications of Brahmo leaders, the anti-colonial protests after the partition of 
Bengal in 1905 were structured by a religious nationalism that was informed by the vision of 
the emerging nation as an incarnation of the goddess Kāli. In the wake of these agitations, 
volunteer brigades, gymnasiums, and nationalist societies were organized which were 
directed at physical training, nationalist indoctrination, and home rule (svadeśī) propaganda 
activities, and one of these nationalist societies, the Anuśīlan Samiti, established the Jugāntar, 
a vernacular newspaper which preached revolutionary terrorism.  
For the editors of the Jugāntar, the destructive aspect of Kāli symbolized the violence 
that was necessary for the political independence of the nation, which was to be effected 
through the deeds of the revolutionaries, viewed as agents in the cosmic play of the divine 
mother. The Bengali novelist Bankim Chandra Chatterjee had invoked Kāli as a symbol of 
the motherland, and in his novel Ānandamath (1881–82) he tried to appropriate the Hindu 
tradition of monasticism (sannyāsa) as a form of world-renunciation that would be dedicated 
to the service of the nation. Chatterjee believed that the resources for responding to western 
notions of liberty, polity, culture and so on had to be supplied by the Sanskritic tradition, 
which raises the issue of whether segments of the population—such as women, Muslims, 
Christians, and so on—who did not have access to this tradition were to be excluded from 
28 Kopf 1979. 
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this process of forming self-identities against the backdrop of the empire. For instance, the 
slogan Vande Mātaram (“I revere the Mother”), which was the rallying cry of the nationalist 
struggles, could also become a divisive point during Hindu–Muslim riots.29  
Elsewhere, in the Punjab, the Arya Samaj, founded in 1875 by Swami Dayananda 
Sarasvati, became increasingly entangled, by the turn of the century, in disputes relating to 
the colonial categories of “religion” and “politics,” and also the decennial census 
classifications which provided figures for the numbers of “Hindus” and “Muslims” in British 
India. The rhetorical idioms directed by Arya Samajists against Muslims through their 
polemical literature was part of their attempts to build a consolidated Hindu community in the 
face of the projected Muslim threat. After asserting that the Arya Samaj believes in the 
doctrine of non-violence, the Arya Jagat noted in an article on 26 September, 1924: “To 
refrain from punishing malignant enemies and allow tyrants to do whatever they like is, 
however, tantamount to committing serious violence.”30 The exclusionary forms of Hindu 
identity developed by the Samaj would be rejected by Gandhi, who highlighted Hindu-
Muslim unity as an integral aspect of the moral and political revival of India. Gandhi 
developed, according to Judith M. Brown, a “complex and nuanced attitude” to violence—for 
instance, holding violent resistance to be superior to cowardice in extreme situations. 31 
Against Hindu nationalists such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, he 
believed that the message of the Bhagavad-gītā was not a literal call to arms for achieving 
good, but rather an allegory of the clash between good and evil in the human heart. At the 
same time, ahiṃsā was not simply the avoidance of harm to others but was “a positive state 
of love, of doing good even to the evil-doer. But it does not mean helping the evil-doer to 
continue the wrong or tolerating it by passive acquiescence—on the contrary, love, the active 
29 Lipner 2008. 
30 Thursby 1975, 170. 
31 Brown 2011, 48-49.  
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state of ahimsa, requires you to resist the wrong-doer by disassociating yourself from him 
even though it may offend him or injure him physically.”32 Gandhi’s critics, in contrast, 
sometimes invoked the Bhagavad-gītā’s template for a righteous war and argued for a more 
militant stance towards Muslims and British colonialists. As his assassin Nathuram Godse 
was to state later: “I could never conceive that an armed resistance to the aggressor is unjust. 
I will consider it a religious and moral duty to resist and if possible overpower such an enemy 
by the use of force … In the Mahābhārata, Arjuna had to fight and slay quite a number of his 
friends and relations …”33  
Starting in 1907, the Arya Samaj came under suspicion for being involved in seditious 
agitation, and in a certain court case in 1908, the eleventh chapter of Dayanand’s 
foundational text, Satyarth Prakash, was declared by the magistrate as objectionable 
literature. The Arya response The Arya Samaj and its Detractors: A Vindication, which 
challenged the claim of Mr A. Grey in the Patiala Case, December 1909–January 1910, that 
the Arya Samaj was a political organization fomenting seditious revolution against the 
government, is an early example of how Muslims are positioned vis-à-vis Hindus by 
employing militant imageries. The text states that before the arrival of Dayananda, the Hindu 
world had forgotten the pure wisdom of the Vedic scriptures, which had become encrusted 
with “Puranic debris and Tantric filth.”34 Dayananda consecrated his life to the recovery of 
Vedic wisdom all over the globe, and he valiantly fought against the forces of 
unrighteousness, superstition, and servile reverence for clerical authority. He vanquished his 
opponents with his incisive logic, piercing irony, profound learning in the Vedas, fiery 
eloquence, and “above all his infinite pity for his suffering fellowmen…” Emphasising that 
his mission was purely religious, the authors described his titanic struggle to assault and 
32 Gandhi 1965, 195. 
33 Jaffrelot 2003, 312. 
34 Rama and Deva 1910, 2. 
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overcome the entrenched powers of conservatism: “Citadel after citadel was captured by 
frontal attacks. He, then, marched triumphantly to the centre of orthodoxy, surrounded the 
walls of the fortress of priestly supremacy, and peremptorily and insistently demanded 
surrendered. The battle thickened. He bore the brunt all alone.”35 The authors emphasized 
that the Arya Samaj is a universal Church which preaches the Vedas revealed to all humanity, 
and with a veiled barb at Christians and Muslims notes that it has no references to “any 
particular favoured or to the matrimonial squabbles and connubial felicity of a prophet.”36  
Dayanand himself, in contrast to the prophet Muhammad, is described as an exemplar 
of forbearance who personified divine forgiveness: “He always met taunts, curses, anathemas 
and imprecations, with blessings, benedictions, good wishes and loving thoughts, and frowns 
by sweet smiles. Such was the man whom the followers of Mohomed … charge with 
intolerance.”37 Turning the tables on Christianity, the authors declare that if the Arya Samaj 
is to be regarded as seditious because its books are supposed to preach intolerance, the 
Christian Church in India too should be suppressed since numerous Biblical passages speak 
of the fury of God against the idols of other nations. More pointedly, they argue that Christian 
missionaries, who complain about the intolerance of the Arya Samajists, should remember 
that “if Dayananda was intolerant because he thundered against the priest craft of all sects, 
Luther was a hundred times more so because he not only condemned evils and evil-doers but 
foully and in some cases without any intellectual warrant and moral justification abused his 
adversaries in debate.”38 As a matter of fact, the ancient Vedic Aryas “were the most tolerant 
of peoples in History—even more tolerant than Christians. While England boasts of being the 
35 Rama and Deva 1910, 6. 
36 Rama and Deva 1910, 30. 
37 Rama and Deva 1910, 97-98. 
38 Rama and Deva 1910, 139. 
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centre of religious freedom, toleration is but a growth of yesterday. The Test Act was 
abolished only in 1828 and the Catholic Emancipation Act was passed in 1829.”39  
Around the time of these legal disputes over the “political” nature of the Arya Samaj, 
Acharya Ramdev, who was a professor of history at its school (Gurukul) at Kangri, wrote a 
two-volume history of India (Bhāratvarṣ kā itihās). The Gurukul was set up in 1902 as an 
educational institution which would seek to revive Sanskrit, promote the use of ārya bhāṣā 
(Sanskritized Hindi), and rewrite the history of the ancient land. The volumes, published 
between 1910 and 1914, were based on his lecture notes at the school, and argue that Vedic 
civilization was the basis for the higher cultures of the world, including the Chinese, Persian, 
Greek, Roman, and Celtic. By studying the history of the ancient Aryan people, Indians 
would be filled with a national pride (jātīya abhimān) at the glorious deeds of their ancestors, 
while the knowledge of their faults would help Indians to move more surely on the path of 
progress. He seeks to counter the Orientalist argument that ancient Indians did not have a 
historical consciousness, and by citing evidence from the Vedas, Chāndogya Upaniṣad, and 
the Kashmiri narrative Rājataraṅgiṇi, replies that ancient Indians did have a historical 
science (aitihāsik vijñān) and, in fact, the methods of modern historical writing were known 
to Aryan historians. However, the reason why Hindus do not have a chronological account of 
their great deeds is because many books with historical accounts had been destroyed by the 
bigoted Muslim invaders.40 Countering another western charge that Indians had never been 
united before British rule, he argues that the land of Bharat had already attained a “high 
degree of political development” at the time of the Mahābhārata (which is dated by him at 
5000 BCE). King Yudhisthir was the ruler of the entire Bharat, and his empire stretched from 
the Hindukush mountains in the north to Cape Comorin in the south. Further, the land was 
governed in accordance with democratic principles; as early as the time of the Brāhmaṇas 
39 Rama and Deva 1910, 92-93. 
40 Fischer-Tine 2003, 118. 
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(which are dated at 10,000 BCE), individuals rose to the position of the king only if they 
were religious (dhārmik) and deeply knowledgeable in the field of politics. The king was 
himself subject to Vedic rules, and had to discuss new laws in a parliament (sabhā bhavan) 
with representatives from all groups of people.41  
 
The Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Nation 
These two Arya Samaj themes—the Muslim as the hostile Other and the narrative of a Vedic 
golden age ruled by egalitarian principles—were actively developed by a diverse set of 
institutions which were connected to the All-India Hindu Mahasabha. The Punjab Hindu 
Sabha was established in 1909 by prominent figures from the Arya Samaj such as Lala Lajpat 
Rai, Lal Chand and others, to unify the Hindus and to generate pride in the ancient Vedic 
civilization. At a conference which was organized in October 1909 with the mission of Hindu 
“consolidation and homogenisation,” several leaders voiced the anxiety that the Hindus were 
undergoing a significant numerical decline relative to the Muslims. As Lal Chand noted: 
“Numbers carry great weight in this age and help materially in deciding the fate of any 
struggle.”42 The leaders emphasized the need for consensus across the Hindu community, 
which had to be organized to defend itself against the Muslim League and also the British 
government which was perceived as hostile to its interests. They criticized the Indian 
National Congress for not supporting “Hindu interests,” and called for a “Hindu-centred 
politics.” The conference passed various resolutions regarding the promotion of Sanskrit and 
Hindi, protection of the cow, development of Ayurvedic medicine, and so on. The anxiety 
relating to the declining numbers of the Hindus was dramatically portrayed in a series of 
letters that Lal Chand published around this time in the Punjabee, where he articulated the 
fear that Hindus were being reduced to an isolated group who could turn neither to the British 
41 Fischer-Tine 2003, 121-123. 
42 Bapu 2013, 18. 
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government nor to the Congress which was indifferent to Hindu issues: “The Hindus have no 
outside friends and sympathisers to look after and press their claims. Inside India they are 
helpless between the police and repressive measures, even if they give utterance to their 
grievances.”43 While he was aware that his promotion of Hindu interests was critiqued by his 
opponents as “sectarianism,” Lal Chand argued that this was “the very breath of life, viz., that 
a Hindu should not only believe but make it part and parcel of his organism, of his life and of 
his conduct, that he is a Hindu first and an Indian after.”44   
These anxieties would later be expressed more vehemently by the All-India Hindu 
Mahasabha, which was set up in the United Provinces in 1915, and later relaunched in 1923, 
with the goal of Hindu organization (saṅgathan) against the perceived threats of the Muslim 
other. The Morley-Minto reforms in 1909 had established separate electorates in the 
provincial councils for Muslims, and within this legal-political framework, the Mahasabha 
sought to consolidate Hindu identity and regenerate Hindu society. The communitarian 
identity that it sought to mobilize involved the promotion of the Hindi language (as the 
cultivated speech of the “Hindus”) instead of Persian-Urdu, and the protection of the cow. 
Starting from Balakrishna Shivram Moonje, the president of the Mahasabha between 1927 
and 1933, leaders of the organization began to directly oppose the Congress, which they 
claimed could not stand up for Hindu rights or promote Hindu unity.  
Expressing the anxiety about declining Hindu numbers, Moonje declared: 
“Democracy means a government which is based on the counting of heads. In India … the 
Moslem heads and the Christian heads are yearly increasing in numbers and are hopefully 
aspiring to swallow up the majority community of the Hindus or to reduce it to a minority 
community.”45 He lamented that while Hindus were divided into “water-tight compartments” 
43 Jones 1976, 285. 
44 Thursby 1975, 160. 
45 Bapu 2013, 52. 
19 
 
                                                            
of numerous castes, which had led to their disintegration, Muslims were well-organized 
members of “one organic community,” and were growing in “numbers, strength, material 
welfare and solidarity.”46 The next president, Bhai Paramanand, called for a Hindu nation 
that would be based on “one language, one religion, and one culture,” and for the Mahasabha 
to become a political party that would capture seats in the legislative assembly and councils. 
Under the leadership of Savarkar, starting from 1937, the Mahasabha began to pursue even 
more actively the program of establishing a Hindu nation (rashtra) by contesting the 
Congress in the political arena. The threat of the Indian Muslims, who had the support of 
non-Indian Muslim nations, looms large in Savarkar’s speeches. According to the speeches, 
they were a powerful minority, and their numbers were increasing with every successive 
census report. They were confident that should the British be defeated in a world war, they 
could call upon neighboring non-Indian Muslim powers to invade India, and wrest it from 
British control and re-establish Muslim rule. 47  The Indian Muslim was “often found to 
cherish an extra-territorial allegiance, is moved more by events in Palestine than what 
concerns India as a Nation, worries himself more about the well-being of the Arabs than the 
well-being of his Hindu neighbours and countrymen in India.”48 Declaring the Mahasabha to 
be primarily not a religious organization (Hindu Dharma Sabha) but a political-national 
organization (Hindu Rashtra Sabha), he called for all Hindu organizations to unite under its 
banner to fight the “pseudo-nationalists [Congress] and Muslims.”49   
Savarkar rejected the principle of territorial nationalism promoted by the Indian 
National Congress, on the grounds that a common territory or habitat could not weld together 
people into a nation, unless they shared religious, racial, cultural, linguistic, and historical 
affinities. Therefore, the Mahasabha stood for the national regeneration of the Hindu people, 
46 Bapu 2013, 49. 
47 Savarkar 1992, 28. 
48 Savarkar 1992, 8. 
49 Bapu 2013, 40-41. 
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which is possible only with their political independence (svarājya), which is not merely their 
territorial independence but also the establishment of their cultural identity. Savarkar singled 
out, in particular, the Congress notion of Hindu-Muslim unity as a “will-o-the-wisp,” and 
stated that it was a mistake on the part of some Hindus to go meekly begging to the anti-
national and fanatical Muslims to join in a common cause. Nevertheless, Hindus were willing 
to grant special protections for Muslims provided they did not infringe on the civil and 
religious liberties of other communities. However, knowing the anti-India designs of the pan-
Islamic movement, Hindus would not trust them any longer with “blank cheques,” but would 
fight for their Hindu identity: “We are not out to fight with England only to find a change of 
masters but we Hindus aim to be masters in our own house. A Swarajya that could only be 
had at the humiliation and cost of Hindutva itself is for us Hindus as good as suicide.” 
Therefore, the true formula for Hindu-Muslim unity should be: “If you join us, we will fight 
with you for national freedom; if you don’t, without you; and if you oppose us, in spite of 
you.”50  
 
Savarkar and the Hindu Self 
The figure of the hostile Muslim is crystallized in Savarkar’s Hindutva, which is widely 
regarded as the pivotal text in the consolidation of Hindu nationalism. Savarkar clearly 
distinguishes between the religious and the doctrinal aspects of Hinduism, on the one hand, 
and Hindutva, on the other, where the former is only a part of the latter, which “embraces all 
the departments of thought and activity of the whole Being of our Hindu race.”51 The key 
moment in Savarkar’s narrative is the day that Sindhusthan (Hindustan), a land of peace and 
plenty, was overrun by Mohammad of Gazni, for on that day “the conflict of life and death 
began. Nothing makes Self conscious of itself so much as a conflict with non-self. Nothing 
50 Savarkar 1992, 12-13. 
51 Savarkar 1928, 3-4. 
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can weld peoples into a nation and nations into a state as the pressure of a common foe. 
Hatred separates as well as unites.”52  The long centuries of conflicts with Arabs, Persians, 
Pathans, Baluchis, Tartars, Turks, and Mughals welded the Hindus into a nation under the 
banner of Hindutva. Whether they were Aryans or non-Aryans, Brahmans or untouchables, 
they “all suffered as Hindus and triumphed as Hindus.” All these Hindus, of different 
peoples, sects, and creeds, who inhabited the land between the Indus and the Indian Ocean 
were “individualised into a single Being.”53  
More specifically, Hindus are a people who dwell in their fatherland (pitribhu) of 
Hindustan, and are bound by the ties of a common blood because they are descended from 
the Vedic fathers. For every Hindu the land of Bharat, of Hindustan, is not only a fatherland 
but also a holy land (punyabhu). Thus Hindus are not only a nation (rashtra) but also a race 
with a common origin (jati). However, these two characteristics also apply to the majority of 
Indian Muslims who, if they are “free from the prejudices born of ignorance,” are able to love 
Hindustan as their fatherland, and who, because they have been recently converted to Islam, 
have inherited Hindu blood. Yet, they cannot be called true Hindus because they do not pay 
homage to the common culture (sanskriti) inherited from Vedic times and preserved through 
Sanskrit.54 Therefore, although Savarkar admits that for some Indian Muslims and Indian 
Christians, Bharat is indeed a fatherland, he claims that they do not view it as a holy land, 
since theirs is Arabia or Palestine. Their “love is divided,” since they set their distant holy 
lands above the fatherland of Bharat. 55 While Hindus are indeed divided into numerous 
castes, these have arisen from intermarriage across the four varṇas of ancient Vedic society, 
and it is the same blood that flows through a Brahman as well as an untouchable. Whether 
they are Aryans or non-Aryans, monists, pantheists, or atheists, Hindus feel that the “same 
52 Savarkar 1928, 42-43. 
53 Savarkar 1928, 45. 
54 Savarkar 1928, 91-92. 
55 Savarkar 1928, 113. 
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ancient blood that coursed through the veins of Ram and Krishna, Buddha and Mahavir, 
Nanak and Caitanya, Basava and Madhava, of Rohidas and Tiruvelluvar courses throughout 
Hindudom from vein to vein, pulsates from heart to heart.”56  
The unity of Hindudom was clearly displayed, according to Savarkar, during the civil 
resistance movement of the Mahasabha against the “anti-Hindu” policies of the Nizam of 
Hyderabad in 1939. He characterized this movement as a “veritable crusade,” a religious war 
of righteousness (dharma yuddha) which had brought together under one banner Hindus from 
different parts of the country—whether they were rich or poor, Arya Samajists, Jains, Sikhs, 
and so on. Savarkar argued that the fact that around fifteen thousand civil resisters were 
mobilized at the first blare of the trumpet demonstrates that the movement for Hindu 
organization should not be treated lightly: “These fifteen thousand Hindu Sangathanists 
constituted a force superior to those English or German forces who are now fighting in 
Europe for their respective Nations in moral courage and had it not been only a Civil 
Resistance Movement and had we been in a position to face our opponents’ bayonet for 
bayonet and rifle for rifle, chances are they would have proved superior to them in an armed 
resistance too.” 57  Savarkar had highlighted this theme of a religious war also in his 
presidential address at the 20th Session of the Mahasabha in 1938, where he noted that in the 
Muslim princely states such as Hyderabad, Bhopal, and others, the religious persecution that 
had been targeted at Hindus was reminiscent of the days of the Muslim rulers such as 
Aurangzeb.  
While various atrocities are being committed on Hindus across the country, the 
Congress Party, which holds on to its “pseudo-nationalism,” condones these violent acts by 
claiming that there is nothing anti-Hindu about them for they can be explained in terms of the 
socio-economic deprivation of its perpetrators. Meanwhile, the Muslim League intends to 
56 Savarkar 1928, 89. 
57 Savarkar, 1992, 39.  
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split India into a Muslim Federation and a Hindu Federation, and invite alien Muslim powers 
to invade the latter: “Such is the present state of the Hindus in Hindusthan, their own land!”58  
 
Hindu Nationalism and Gandhian Non-Violence 
The Hindu Mahasabha viewed Hindu masculinity—expressed through the physical strength 
of a vigorous and strong body—as the basis for the regeneration of a strong Hindu nation. 
The masculine power of Hindus would regenerate a virile, martial, and unified community, 
and would avenge the humiliations that the Hindu nation had suffered under the British. 
Medieval figures such as Maharana Pratap, Shivaji, and others, who had valiantly fought 
against the Mughals were reclaimed as exemplars of a militant nation based on self-rule 
(svarāj) and political unity. Several leaders of the Mahasabha called for the establishment of 
wrestling gymnasiums (akhāṛā), where, to counter the British charge that Hindus were 
physically weak and effeminate, the manliness of the Hindus would be cultivated through 
fitness training programs. For instance, at the 1923 Session of the Mahasabha, M.M. Malviya 
urged the construction of a temple to the god Hanuman and an akhāṛā in every village and 
urban quarter of the country. Since the weak, pacific, and cowardly Hindus had been overrun 
by the aggressive and violent Muslims, B.S. Moonje called for the reinstallation of the Vedic 
practice of animal sacrifice so that Hindus would become hardened to the sight of blood and 
killing. 59  He claimed that violence to defend one’s rights is not to be condemned, and 
admitted that he “liked [d] the Muslims for the virile vigilance with which they protect their 
racial interests … which, alas, is visibly lacking in the present-day Hindu race.” 60  The 
Mahasabha pursued several militarization drives, starting from the late 1930s, to set up 
militias which would protect the nation from internal and external threats, and in particular 
58 Savarkar 1992, 17-18. 
59 Bapu 2013, 83-85. 
60 Jaffrelot 2003, 306.  
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defend the Hindus from the threat of an Islamic invasion if the British were to be defeated in 
the Second World War. The Ram Sena (Army of Ram) was set up in March 1940, with 
Moonje as the president. 
Reinforcing this theme of Hindu feebleness, one of Savarkar’s specific critiques of 
Gandhi was Hindus had become weakened by adopting his teaching of non-violence, 
precisely at a historical conjuncture when Hindu militarization in the face of the Muslim 
threat was imperative. While Muslims, who didn’t care for Gandhi’s non-violence, have 
gained numerical superiority in the army and the armed police, the martial instinct of Hindus 
has been diluted by the adoption of non-violence.61 He condemned the doctrine of absolute 
non-violence which would reject all armed resistance as impracticable as well as immoral. 
The Sabha instead accepted, he argued, the virtue of relative non-violence, that is, non-
violence in all circumstances except when armed resistance to aggression is justifiable as well 
as imperative: “To save a saint from being murdered outright by a violent and armed sinner, 
Ahimsa itself requires that the sinner should be killed there and then if that act alone could 
save the life of the saint.”62 At the 24th Session of the Mahasabha in 1942, Savarkar noted 
because of the Gandhian claim that the true spiritual warrior was the spinner of homemade 
cloth, Hindus had largely refused to join the Army, so that the percentage of Muslims in the 
Army had risen to 62 %. However, after the British government had opened up the Army, 
Navy, and the Air Forces to Hindus, as part of the war effort, the Sabha had generated 
military enthusiasm among Hindus, and sent thousands of them to the military forces, with 
the result that this figure has come down to 32 %.63  
 
Violence and Mythic Time 
61 Savarkar 1992, 86.  
62 Savarkar 1992, 83-84.  
63 Savarkar 1992, 125. 
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According to Mark uergensmeyer, religions seek to establish an “ultimate order” against the 
“ultimate disorder” of death, and this clash between order and chaos is symbolically 
represented in terms of sacrifices and divine power. Through these images, the disorder of 
violence is conceptually tamed and peace is restored; thus Christ’s violent death opened the 
way to redemption for his followers, and the two-edged sword in Sikhism reminds the Sikh of 
the battle between belief and unbelief within the soul. However, in periods of natural 
disasters and political threats, these images of cosmic violence, which represent the ritual 
domestication of violence, can become correlated with concrete socio-historical threats and 
anxieties, where groups such as westerners, European colonialists, ethnic rivals, and others 
are identified as the evil and disorderly others. The imagery of cosmic warfare is then 
employed by leaders of revolutionary situations to give moral justification to their violent 
acts.64 This intertwining between sacred history and secular temporality is evident in the 
popular histories of the first crusade constructed by three twelfth-century monks, Robert the 
Monk, Guibert of Nogent, and Baldric of Bourgueil, who encapsulated the event within 
providential history, by claiming that it was Christ who had inspired and sustained the 
crusaders through a miraculous intervention in their military victories. Further, they saw the 
crusade as a fulfillment of biblical prophecies: through their exegeses of prophetic passages 
in the Psalms, Proverbs, Isaiah, Zacharias and elsewhere, they argued that scripture had 
foretold the siege of Jerusalem and had also indicated that Jerusalem would be rebuilt by 
foreigners. As Riley-Smith notes: “It is not hard to imagine the shock caused by a realization 
that passages in scripture which had always been thought to have been susceptible only to 
allegorical interpretation were suddenly being literally fulfilled.”65  
                Our discussion has highlighted that diverse Hindu texts too have been continuously 
re-imagined in specific socio-historical conjunctures to construct the otherness of those who 
64 Juergensmeyer 1993, 163. 
65 Riley-Smith 1991, 143.  
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are perceived as historical opponents, whether non-Vedic Buddhists in classical India, the 
foreign Muslim invaders in medieval India, or the British colonialists. The theme of a Vedic 
India which had suffered a decline and whose descendants had lost their inner strength began 
to appear from around the turn of the twentieth century. Some Hindu figures, in response, 
elaborated a binary contrast between a “materialistic West” and a “spiritual East,” according 
to which the Hindus had remained spiritually sovereign even in their colonial subjugation by 
“masculine” Western powers. These gendered constructs of the “manly Englishman” and the 
“effeminate Bengali” emerged from the intersections of the multiple axes of race, religion, 
and sexuality as British administrators, male Indian nationalists, Englishwomen, and Indian 
women responded to the various tensions and anxieties thrown up by contemporary social 
and political currents in late nineteenth century Bengal.66 Thus, one of the most important 
formulators of this distinction, Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902) argued: “Let others talk of 
politics, of the glory of acquisition of immense wealth poured in by trade, of the power and 
spread of commercialism, of the glorious fountain of physical liberty; but these the Hindu 
mind does not understand and does not want to understand. Touch him on spirituality, on 
religion, on God, on the soul, on the infinite, on spiritual freedom, and I assure you, the 
lowest peasant in India is better informed on these subjects than many a so-called philosopher 
in other lands. I have said … that we have yet something to teach to the world.”67 At the 
same time, he acknowledged that the Hindus have become weakened, so that what they 
needed was not immersion in spirituality but recovery of physical strength: “First of all, our 
young men must be strong. Religion will come afterwards. Be strong, my young friends; that 
is my advice to you. You will be nearer to Heaven through football than through the study of 
66 Sinha 1995, 48. 
67 Vivekananda 1992, Vol III, 148.  
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the Gita. These are bold words, but I have to say them, for I love you … You will understand 
the Gita better with your biceps, your muscles, a little stronger.”68  
 
The themes of the recovery of Hindu strength would later be rearticulated more 
vehemently with idioms and metaphors drawn from various scriptural texts. From 1911 the 
traditional Ramlila procession during the Hindu festival of Dusshera in areas such as Benares 
and Mathura in northern India began to combine the mythic depictions of Ram slaying the 
demon Ravana with revolutionary figures from recent times such as the Queen of Jhansi, 
Aurobindo Ghose, and Bal Gangadhar Tilak. The provincial administration was particularly 
alarmed by the report that during a certain procession, a figure of the Queen rode “on 
horseback with a British soldier transfixed on her spear.” 69  Similar fusions of religious 
archetypes and nationalist messages appear in the “political Vedanta” of Aurobindo, where 
the nation is viewed as an aggregate of finite embodiments of the divine feminine power 
(Śakti), identified with the Goddess Kali. An order of ascetics (sannyāsins) should be ready to 
die for the Goddess, to bring about the political independence of India and also recover 
India’s status as the agent for the spiritual regeneration of humanity.70 Aurobindo declared 
that “[t]o shrink from bloodshed and violence under such circumstances is a weakness 
deserving as severe a rebuke as Sri Krishna addressed to Arjuna when he shrank from the 
colossal civil slaughter on the field of Kurukshetra.”71 The demoniac others in many of these 
narratives, which infused contemporary events with mythic significance, were the Muslims 
who are depicted as bloodthirsty fanatics intent on undermining the Hindu nation.  
For instance, in a series of articles in the Organiser in 1962, Sita Ram oel noted that 
figures such as Bharata may be mythical for modern minds, but for the Hindus they are 
68 Vivekananda 1992, Vol III, 242.  
69 Freitag 1989, 199-202. 
70 Southard 1980, 364.  
71 Minor 1986, 65. 
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“more real than Alexander or Caesar or Ashoka or Akbar.” The history of the Hindus, he 
claimed, is a long narrative of how numerous Muslim dynasties were swept away by Hindu 
heroism, which had a single aim—the destruction and the dispersal of Muslim invaders.72 
Goel’s narrative is an instance of what Gyanendra Pandey has described as “Hindu 
history”—the set of writings, usually in Hindi, which argue that the Hindus in contemporary 
India possess a history that is dichotomous from that of the Muslims, and that the former is 
synonymous with Indian history. The Hindu historians set the current decadence of the land 
against the backdrop of a glorious past, a decline that was instigated by waves of invasions of 
the Muslims with whom the Hindus have been engaged in mortal combat. In their chronology 
of events at the temple town of Ayodhya in northern India, the God Ram was born in 
Ayodhya around 9,00,000 years ago, the Hindu King Vikramaditya constructed a temple at 
the birthplace of Ram sometime before the Christian era, this was destroyed by the Mughal 
emperor Babar in 1528 to set up a mosque, and the destruction was followed by 76 “wars of 
liberation” (between then and December 1992) which were carried out by the Hindus to build 
a temple in place of the mosque.73 The narrative of the devotees of Ram versus the Muslims 
draws upon mythic clashes between the gods and the demons in classical Hindu epics, and 
places contemporary events at Ayodhya as “a replay of this eternal contest.” 74  For the 
enactment of this battle, Hindus have to be prepared to meet the solidly organized Muslims 
with physical strength, and not be ensnared by teachings that promote apathy or pacifism.  
These oppositional identities between “Hindus” and “Muslims” are summarized in a 
statement of the VHP, a Hindu nationalist organization: “Islam has never learnt to argue its 
case with facts or logic. All through its history, it has relied on the sword and street riots.”75 
Several pamphlets and books written by Hindu nationalists, from the 1880s onwards, began 
72 Udayakumar 2005, 31-32. 
73 Pandey 1995, 373-380. 
74 Pandey 1995, 386. 
75 Udayakumar 2005, 37. 
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to present Islam as a violent and fanatical religion, driven by bloodthirsty invaders who were 
intent on killing and enslaving Hindus in the name of a holy war. While Hindus were tolerant, 
peace-loving, and generous, the aggressive, despotic, and bigoted Muslims had failed to enter 
into fellowships with the Hindus and had remained aliens to the Hindu cultures of the 
country. Though these narratives present a monolithic “Hindu consciousness” of being 
oppressed by Muslims throughout history, medieval texts usually referred to Muslim rulers as 
Yavanas (Indo-Greeks) and Shakas, two groups which had invaded the northwest from 
around the second century BCE, which indicates that the Muslims were othered not so much 
because of their Islamic beliefs but because of the threat that they posed to the socio-
hierarchical privileges of the Brahmins. The terms “Islam” and “Muslim,” or references to 
Islamic beliefs or doctrines, do not occur in epigraphical records in medieval Andhra 
Pradesh, which refer to the invaders with the ethnic categories of Turk (Turushka), Persian 
(Parasika) and Greek (Yavana).  
While the figure of the holy warrior (ghazi) who destroys Hindu idols appears around 
the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, this image was sometimes projected backwards to 
several Turkic invaders from earlier centuries who were depicted as demolishing or 
desecrating Hindu shrines. However, Talbot argues that the iconoclastic boasts made by some 
Muslim warriors should not be taken at face value, for the “rhetoric of religious war in Indo-
Turkish historical chronicles frequently served to either inflate the importance of minor 
military campaigns or to mask the raw political ambition of rulers.” 76  Nor is temple 
desecration exclusively an Islamic enterprise. The medieval historian Kalhana notes that the 
King Samkaravarman (883–902 CE) became overpowered by avaricious habits, and began to 
oppress his subjects and also to destroy temples and rob them of their wealth: “He took from 
the temples the profits arising from the sale of incense, sandal-wood, and other [articles of 
76 Talbot 1995, 719. 
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worship] … Then, again, he plundered straightaway sixty-four temples …” 77  The King 
Harsa (1089–1101 CE), who plundered the wealth of several temples and defiled the images 
in many, is described, in fact, as a Turushka (Turk).78  
Patterns of Hindu-Muslim interreligious violence, then, should be understood not in 
terms of two implacably opposed religious worldviews but of a series of contingent 
imbrications of religious themes with highly contested political identities. A factor that 
contributed to Hindu-Muslim conflicts in British India was the synchronization of Hindu 
festivals such as Ram Lila with Muslim observances of Eid, where the sacrifice of cows 
became a major flashpoint. Hindus and Muslims also clashed over the question of whether 
Hindus who were carrying out musical processions through streets should stop the music in 
front of mosques. For instance, a major communal riot broke out on 2 April, 1926 in Calcutta 
when a drummer in an Arya Samaj procession refused to stop playing in front of a mosque, 
around the time of the four o’clock call to prayer. The fighting between the Hindus and the 
Muslims soon spread out into neighboring streets, and the next day there were attacks on 
Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh places of worship in the north of the city. 79  Regarding cow 
slaughter and the playing of music, Thursby notes that these activities were so directly 
associated with “communal conflicts in the 1920s that some observers have referred to the 
Hindu-Muslim clashes of the period simply as the ‘cow-music’ question.”80 More recently, 
Paul Brass (2003) has criticized explanations of Hindu-Muslim riots which see them as 
inevitable outbreaks of violence between communities divided by deep fault-lines. He argues 
that in northern Indian towns such as Aligarh, which have witnessed endemic riots, 
institutionalized systems of riot production have been generated in the decades after 
independence. Brass shows that the localities in Aligarh which have frequently witnessed 
77 Stein 1900, 208. 
78 Stein 1900, 353. 
79 Thursby 1976, 95. 
80 Thursby 1976, 76. 
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riots are characterised by the presence of riot-specialists, who are able to draw upon the 
discourses of threat to Hindus to orchestrate the violence, and later interpret it as a “natural” 
Hindu response of self-defense. Riots on a large scale are activated under specific 
circumstances such as electoral competitions by various actors, especially militant Hindu 
nationalists who address groups of potential rioters with inflammatory speeches.   
 
Conclusion 
The socio-political crucible of late colonial India was an intensely contested ground where 
conflicting notions of nationhood were imagined and enacted. These narrations were pivoted 
on the construction of the figure of the Muslim who was portrayed as descended from 
medieval bloodthirsty invaders, and fanatically intent on unravelling the fabrics of peace-
loving Hindu cultures. These two moments—the articulation of the boundaries of the robust 
Hindu nation and the projection of the Muslim as the enemy lurking at the gates—have been 
integral to the shaping of Hindu cultural nationalism by several key thinkers and political 
activists. For instance, the VHP organized in 1983 the Sacrifice for Unity (Ekatmata Yajna), 
which involved three chariots (raths) that moved along three pilgrimage routes through the 
country with a statue of Mother India (Bharat Mata) and a ritual pot with the waters of the 
Ganges. The VHP leader Ashok Singhal noted that the event brought together religious 
leaders from not only various sects of Hinduism, but also Buddhism, Sikhism and Jainism. 
He emphasised that this unity needed to be developed so that the “foreign powers of Islam 
and Christianity” do not regard the weaker sections of Hindu society to be vulnerable.81 The 
anxiety towards the machinations of the foreign powers, who could also be the internal 
others, is reflected in the statement by Shivram Shankar Apte at the foundation of the VHP in 
1964: “The world has been divided into Christian, Islamic and Communist [zones], and these 
81 McKean 1996, 120.  
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three consider Hindu society to be a very good and very rich food upon which they feast and 
grow fat. It is therefore necessary, in this age of competition and conflict, to think of 
organising the Hindu world to save it from the evil eyes of these three.”82  
Hindu engagements with violence which have been structured by scriptural themes 
reveal that violence has been regulated, enacted or denied in complex ways that the 
projection of an intrinsically “nonviolent Hinduism” obscures. Through a detailed study of 
certain Brahmanical Vedic texts and aspects of the Mahābhārata, Brian Collins (2014) has 
argued that Rene Girard’s critique of sacrificial violence and the scapegoating mechanism is 
already present in certain classical Hindu sources. The Brahmanical traditions seek to chart a 
middle course between, on the one hand, the condemnation of intending to harm others 
through cruelty, anger, or hatred, and, on the other hand, the prescription of causing pain to 
specific kinds of living beings as the duty of Brahmin priests in sacrifice and of kings in 
governing the people. Beyond these empirical concerns lies the cultivation of ahiṃsā the 
conjunction of not intending harm as well as not causing pain, which is presented as the 
highest ideal in some of the renouncer traditions, where the empirical self becomes the 
battleground for the struggle against the inner enemy of evil passions and dispositions. This 
ideal ahimsa co-existed with other “realistic” strands which accepted that violence could be 
necessary in certain worldly contexts, especially in the presence of forces which challenged 
the dharmic order.83 Thus, disputes based on Vedic orthodoxy were channelled, in classical 
India, through the mythical frameworks of gods clashing with demons, and later in the 
medieval centuries this template was extended to the Muslim foreigners who threatened the 
Brahmanical socio-religious orders. The electoral mechanisms of colonial modernity spurred 
Hindu anxieties about a weakened race which would die out in the face of Muslim solidarity, 
and various Hindu nationalist organizations began to increasingly draw upon motifs from the 
82 Jaffrelot 2001, 392. 
83 Clooney 2003, 123.  
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Vedas, Bhagavad-gītā, and other texts to speak of a martial Hindu nation. Against this 
complex socio-historical backdrop, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded in 
1925, envisages a glorious Hindu nation symbolized as the mother who should be heroically 
worshipped and served selflessly. In an appropriation of Hindu mythic themes, the autumn 
festival of Dashehra, which celebrates the victory of Lord Rama over the demon king, is 
given a martial tone, with the worship of weapons associated with the medieval King Shivaji. 
The RSS has a strong, hierarchical organization with charismatic leaders at the apex such as 
Dr. Hedgewar (1925–40), who was called Doctorji, and Golwalkar (1940–73) who was called 
Guruji. The formal hierarchy of the system includes a network of organizers who are usually 
young unmarried men with an ascetic living style, and who both supervise the functioning of 
the branches (sakhas) at the base and coordinate the activities of the RSS at city, state, and 
national levels. 84  Though the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which emerged in the early 
1980s, has sometimes been associated with the RSS, the party has usually avoided the 
explicit anti-Muslim and anti-Christian rhetoric of the RSS, instead using the slogans of self-
reliance, Indianization, and integral humanism. As the trajectories of the multiple 
imaginations of the Hindu nation indicate, the attempts to ground the Indian nation-state on 
Hindu foundations remain an intensely contested matter, especially given the violent conflicts 
that such attempts have sometimes generated. 85  Thus, the forms of violence in Hindu 
universes should be placed within their dynamic socio-historical contexts where Hindus have 
interpreted, engaged with, and acted on a range of scriptural texts both to generate violent 
solidarities and to speak of peace.  
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